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ABSTRACT. In The Nature of Selection (1984), Sober argued that natural selection is in
principle powerless to explain why any individual organism has the traits it does rather
than the very same individual having different traits. A debate ensued, in which critics
have argued against Sober by laying explanations end-to-end, to form a chain of
explanation that begins with selection and passes through one or more intermediate
events before reaching the target explanandum. I argue that Sober’s critics
misunderstand how contrastive explananda (why p rather than q) behave in such
explanatory chains, and that this strategy has so far failed.
1 Introduction
In The Nature of Selection (1984), Sober contrasts two strategies for explaining why a
roomful of schoolchildren all read at the third-grade level. To give a developmental
explanation, you would attend to one child at a time and describe the earlier events that led
to that child’s current reading proficiency. To give a selectional explanation, you would note
that reading at the third-grade level was a prerequisite for admittance to the class—children
at other reading levels were excluded. But we shouldn’t think that the two strategies address
the same question:
The developmental story says why each individual has one reading level rather
than another. The selectional story, on the other hand, shows why the room is
filled with individuals reading at the third grade level rather than with different
people with different reading abilities. (Sober 1984, 150)
Selective admittance explains why Sally is in the classroom rather than having been turned
away, but it does not explain why she reads at one level rather than another. Similarly
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(reasons Sober), natural selection in biological evolution does not explain why any particular
individual has the traits it does (say, a short, thick beak, and a large body) rather than the
very same individual having different traits (say, a long, narrow beak, and a smaller body).
Call this claim S (for Sober). What natural selection does explain, say Sober and subsequent
advocates of S, is why this individual before us with the short beak and large body is present
in the population rather than some other individual with a long beak and a smaller body. More
generally, what selection can explain is why a population consists of one set of individuals
(with such and such features) rather than another set (with different features).
There is an active opposition to S, and the manner in which critics argue against S has two
conspicuous features. First, Sober’s critics argue almost exclusively via what I’ll call the
explanatory-chain strategy. They accept that Sober’s reasoning makes direct appeal to
natural selection unconvincing, but they say that selection does explain some intermediate
explanandum (what the intermediate is varies from argument to argument), and then they
argue that this intermediate in turn explains Sober’s explanandum. Since the explanation
relation is transitive, Sober’s critics continue, selection really does explain Sober’s
explanandum, so S is false.1 Second, critics give short shrift to Sober’s “rather than” clause.
Sober’s explanandum is contrastive (why p rather than q). But critics chop off the contrastive
clause and address their arguments to the leftover stump “why p,” sometimes adding—as
though an afterthought—that by “why p,” they mean “why p rather than q.”2
This abbreviation of the explanandum would be unproblematic if arguments about “why p”
were to generalize straightforwardly to “why p rather than q.” I argue that they do not.
Unless Sober’s critics are simply talking past him, they must squarely address the contrastive
explanandum. Once they do this, I argue, the explanatory chain arguments fall apart. In what
follows, I show that when viewed contrastively, the explanatory chain arguments are invalid.
These arguments rest (implicitly) on certain trans-world identity assignments, but offer no
theory of identity that could underwrite those assignments. This is particularly bad news for
opponents of S, not only because there is no theory on the table that would do the job, but
because independence from such metaphysical assumptions is one of the selling points of their
position (Forber 2005).
2 Preliminaries
Sober’s classroom illustration motivates S, but there is also a more substantive argument, a
quick rehearsal of which will supply the background needed for my analysis of the
1Neander (1988, 1995b,a), Matthen (1999), Forber (2005), and Nanay (2005, 2010) all pursue variations
on this strategy; one exception is Birch (2012).
2Neander (1988) presents Sober’s position and argues against it all without mention of contrastive ex-
plananda. Nanay (2005) does the same. Neander (1995a) acknowledges Sober’s contrastive clause, yet frames
her argument against S in non-contrastive terms. Nanay tacks the contrastive clause onto the end of his previous
argument in a follow-up note (Nanay 2010). Forber (2005) presents Sober’s position without mention of the
contrastive clause, but later alludes to it in some parenthetical comments (pp.336–339). The exceptions to the
“short shrift” generalization are Matthen (1999) and Birch (2012).
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explanatory-chain strategy used against S. Let genetic trait t be an adaptation, and organism
O an individual that has t.3 Does selection explain why O has t rather than another trait?
Consider a counterfactual history in which an alternative selection regime shaped the
population. Having another selection regime in place just means that different individuals will
survive and reproduce. This different selection regime can change O’s genotype only (barring
horizontal gene transfer) by changing who survives and reproduces among O’s ancestors. But
if any of O’s ancestors fail to survive and reproduce, then O will never come to be. Thus an
alternative selection regime cannot lead to O having different traits, and therefore the actual
selection regime does not explain why O has t rather than another trait (Sober 1995).
Notice that the argument depends on the counterfactual scenario lacking any organism that
can count as the same as (numerically identical with) organism O. Though Sober doesn’t
endorse any particular theory of trans-world identity for individual organisms, the following
constraint on trans-world identity assignments would suffice for generating the required
non-identity rulings: looking across alternative possible scenarios, “two” organisms can count
as the same individual only if they have the same parents (Matthen 1999). Call this
constraint ancestor essentialism.4
Regarding the “explains” relation, the argument supposes that among the necessary
conditions for “w explains why p rather than q” is that had w failed to obtain, then q would
have occurred instead of p. I too will operate with this understanding of contrastive
explanation, but I want to acknowledge that it is unclear exactly what sort of counterfactual
is required, and to suitably relax the requirement. It may be good enough that had w ′
obtained (for some particular w ′ mutually exclusive from w), then q would have occurred.
And perhaps it is enough that were w ′ to occur, then q would be probable, or at least more
probable than otherwise. I assume only that some such counterfactual is a necessary
condition for “w explains why p rather than q,” and I introduce a placeholder for the
appropriate type of counterfactual conditional. So that we don’t forget this is just a
placeholder, I use the non-standard ‘umbrella handle’ arrow (↪→) to denote the relation.
Nothing in what follows will depend on the precise nature of the ↪→ relation.5
3 The explanatory-chain strategy
The literature includes several instantiations of the explanatory-chain strategy, but they all
admit of the same analysis. So I will discuss only the original version—what I’ll call the Origin
Argument (Neander 1988, 1995b,a; Forber 2005). That argument goes as follows. Again we
have organism O with trait t. Stipulate that the actual past selection regime explains the first
appearance of t in some past generation, and that O inherits t from members of that past
3I limit the discussion to genetic traits in order to bracket complications introduced by development.
4Matthen (1999) calls it origin essentialism, but there are a number of different theses with that name, and
in the present case it is more accurate to say ancestor essentialism, so I switch to that term.
5Also note that in the literature arguing about S—as in the broader literature on explanation—“explains”
means helps explain, or partly explains; it does not mean explains fully. I follow this usage.
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generation. The argument then goes:
(1) Selection explains the presence of trait t in some past generation.
(2) The presence of t in that past generation explains (via heredity) why O bears t.
(3) Selection explains why O bears t.
The general form of the argument is:
(1) w explains why x
(2) x explains why p
(3) w explains why p.
Supposing the “explains” relation is transitive, the argument form is valid.6 But this can’t be
the whole argument. Unless critics are simply talking past Sober, the argument above must
be read as a gesture at some other, nearby argument that employs contrastive explananda. A
fully fleshed-out Origin Argument must have the form:
(1) w explains why x rather than z.
(2) x explains why p rather than q.
(3) w explains why p rather than q.
This form, however, is invalid. To illustrate, I repurpose the setup of the well-known trolley
problem (Foot 1967).
A runaway trolley (streetcar) is barreling down an unused section of track towards five
oblivious workers. You stand at a lever that would divert the trolley to another track, where
there is just one oblivious worker. The only way you can influence the outcome is by pulling
the lever. Say you pull the lever and the lone worker is killed. The next day, there is a funeral.
So the actual events were: your pulling the lever, the death of the worker, and the funeral.
Bringing in contrastive clauses, let the final explanandum be why there was a funeral rather
than no funeral (why p rather than q). This is explained by the death of the worker (x
explains why p rather than q). Had no one died, there would have been no funeral. And let
the intermediate explanandum be why one worker was killed rather than five (why x rather
than z). This is explained by your pulling the lever (w explains why x rather than z). Had
you stood by, then five would have died. So both premises are true. Yet the conclusion is
false: your pulling the lever does not explain why there was one funeral rather than no
funeral. Had you not pulled the lever, there would have been five funerals.
The counterexample works by employing two different alternatives to the actual intermediate
event x (the death of the one worker). One of those alternatives (five workers die) is relevant
only to the first link in the explanation chain, while the other (no deaths) is relevant only to
the second link.7 (See Figure 1 for a visual aid.) This allows for there to be an appropriate
6I won’t press the point, but the transitivity of explanation is controversial (e.g., Putnam 1973).
7The insight behind this counterexample comes from recent work on the metaphysics of causation (see Hall
2000; Maslen 2004; Schaffer 2005) in which alleged counterexamples to the transitivity of causation (A causes
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true counterfactual associated with each link in the chain, yet no such counterfactual that
runs the whole length of the chain. In other words, don’t pull ↪→ five deaths and no deaths








Figure 1: Schematic illustration of a counterexample to the validity of the explanation-chain
argument form. (Dotted lines are counterfactuals.)
Notice that if both links in the chain were to use the same alternative to the actual
intermediate event, then we could avoid the kind of disconnect just described. With this in
mind, consider the following quick fix. Both alternatives to the actual intermediate event
satisfy the coarse-grained description “lone worker survives.” So why not lump them together
under that heading and consider them one and the same? This seems to make the problem go












Figure 2: The trolley example again, now using the coarse-grained description “lone worker
survives” to encompass both alternatives to the actual intermediate event.
The trouble with this fix is that it introduces an equivocation. There are relevantly different
ways in which the lone worker might have survived, and not pulling the lever leads to a very
specific one (in which five other workers die), which is incompatible with any of the ways of
instantiating the lone worker survives that might have led to a final outcome of no funerals.
So this fix does not work. It does, however, camouflage the problem. Imagine that the
beginning-to-end counterfactual don’t pull ↪→ no funerals were not transparently false. And
say we believe the ↪→ relation is transitive. In this imaginary situation, we might well look at
Figure 2 and find ourselves thinking: “It appears I’ve shown that don’t pull ↪→ no funerals
must be true—and that pulling the lever does explain why there was one funeral rather than
no funerals.” I suggest that Sober’s critics have fallen victim to a mirage like this one.
To see how, I must first reformulate the Origin Argument using contrastive explananda. The
contrastive clause in Sober’s explanandum is rather than the same organism having another
trait. To keep things simple, I’ll treat having t as one trait, and lacking t as the alternative.
Here is my first-pass reformulation:
B, and B causes C, but A doesn’t cause C) are disarmed by arguing that the two instances of ‘B’ are really not
the same relatum. If the two instances of ‘B’ are really different relata, then what we have is A causes B, and
C causes D, in which case it is no challenge to transitivity that A doesn’t cause D. These authors disambiguate
the two instances of ‘B’ by introducing contrastive clauses—one instance of ‘B’ is really ‘B rather than B′’ while
the other is really ‘B rather than B?’ (where B′ and B? are different counterfactual events).
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(1) Selection explains why trait t was present in the past population rather than absent.
(2) The presence of t in the past generation explains (via heredity) why O has t rather than O lacking t.
(3) Selection explains why O has t rather than O lacking t.
Given what I’ve assumed about the explanation relation, the argument’s conclusion is true
only if, for some relevant alternative to the actual selection regime, the counterfactual
different selection regime ↪→ O lacks t is true. The counterfactuals associated with the first
and second premises are: (1′) different selection regime ↪→ past population lacks t, and (2′)
past population lacks t ↪→ O lacks t. Verbally, the consequent of (1′) and antecedent of (2′)
are the same. But in light of the preceding discussion, we should ask whether this broad event











Figure 3: Schematic illustration of (a contrastive reconstruction of) the Origin Argument.
Dotted lines are counterfactuals. Does the event description t absent hide an equivocation?
Whether the Origin Argument equivocates turns on trans-world identity assignments for
individual organisms. To see this, suppose—for just a moment—ancestor essentialism.
Starting with the first link in the chain, a different selection regime cannot (assuming ancestor
essentialism) deliver a t-less past population without also precluding the existence of every
individual that bears t in the actual past population (see § 2). But some of those past
t-bearers are ancestors of O. In other words, that first link can be true only if the
intermediate counterfactual population lacks some of O’s ancestors. But, of course, only a
past population that includes all of O’s ancestors could lead to a final outcome in which O is
present but lacks t. So the second link can be true only if the intermediate counterfactual
population includes all of those ancestors. Consequently, there is no way to instantiate the
event description “t absent” (Figure 3) that will render both links in the chain true. The
Origin Argument equivocates (supposing ancestor essentialism).
The Origin Argument succeeds only if it does not equivocate, and to show that it does not
equivocate is to show that the kind of t-less past population that can result from an
alternative selection regime is also one that can lead to a final outcome that includes
organism O. Doing that requires saying what it takes to count as organism O. The Origin
Argument involves a sleight of hand that obscure this requirement.
There is currently no theory of identity on the table that would do the job. Matthen’s (1999)
argument against ancestor essentialism offers only a hint of a suggestion for an alternative
theory that may be more favorable to opponents of S.8 No other opponent of S has engaged
the topic. Yet without a theory of trans-world identity, the Origin Argument is invalid.
8See Lewens (2001) and Pust (2004) for attempts to flesh out, then criticize, Matthen’s hint.
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4 Conclusion
Sober’s critics argue against his position primarily via the explanatory-chain strategy (the
Origin Argument is a representative instance). I attribute the intuitive plausibility of these
chain arguments to their non-contrastive formulation: When the links in the chain are
formulated non-contrastively as “w explains x” and “x explains p,” and when it is added only
as an afterthought that by “p” one means “p rather than q,” then the “rather than” clause of
the intermediate explanandum gets swept under the rug. This intermediate contrastive clause
is where the equivocations hide.
The Origin Argument is invalid until the equivocation problem is fixed. The same goes for
other instances of the explanatory-chain strategy (Matthen 1999; Nanay 2005, 2010). If my
analysis is correct, opponents of S would seem to have three options: (a) give up the claim to
do without metaphysical assumptions, then devise and defend a theory of trans-world identity
that will underwrite the identity assignments required by their arguments, (b) abandon the
explanatory-chain strategy and go back to the drawing board, or (c) stick to non-contrastive
explanatory chains and concede that their arguments talk past Sober’s position.
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